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Abstract
This paper aims to prove that during the transformation process in Poland of the 
sectors of general economic interests due to specific economic characteristics of 
those sectors and the fact that interests of three groups participating in the decision 
making in this process: government, management and employees turned out being 
non controversial prevented loosing the monopoly status they initially enjoyed. The 
method used was the analysis of the stages of negotiation illustrated by subsequent 
documents of official strategies chosen for three sectors: railway, electricity and 
the final result illustrated by the structure of the market. Preventing the monopoly 
status permitted those groups seeking the rent, the monopoly status created or even 
demand that rent in the form of subsidy from the public authorities budgets by the 
threat of the strike which is the grave threat in the sectors delivering the service of 
general economic interest.
* Dr. hab. K. Bobińska, Institute of Economic Science, Polish Academy of Sciences. 
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I. Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to prove that during the transformation 
process of the Polish sectors of general economic interest1 a wide range of 
actions were undertaken by a number of interest groups in an effort to maintain 
their monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic positions. It will also be shown that 
the following two factors played a major role in this process: (1) specific 
economic characteristics of the sectors, and (2) the undisputed interests of 
three major players who shaped the transformation process.
The thesis of this article will be presented by analysing the transformation 
process of two selected sectors: railways and electricity. A comparison will be 
made between subsequent strategic plans applied by public authorities in each 
sector. The selection of these particular industries was intentional because, at 
the outset, they significantly differed in their organisational structure. This paper 
is intended to prove that the initial structure of the monopolistic enterprises 
had no influence on the outcome of the transformation process which, for both 
sectors, was the preservation of their monopoly status. It will be shown that the 
analogies in the transformation processes of these industries have brought them, 
step by step, to become comparable oligopolistic structures.
Initially, the electricity sector was structured to be quasi-competitive, under 
regulatory induced competition, while the railway industry was from the out 
set designed to be an unquestionable monopoly. However, to explain their 
transformation process, the real interests of the parties involved in it will need 
to be identified. To do so, this paper will present an analysis of the reasons 
behind the transformation steps progressively taken by public authorities, but 
subsequently withdrawn. This way, the degree will be shown, to which the 
influence of special interest groups shaped, or changed public initiatives that 
were unacceptable to them. Judging by the results and theoretical analyses, 
similar phenomena are quite likely to be occurring in other European countries. 
Nevertheless, the documents that are used here in an attempt to prove the 
paper’s hypothesis, relate to Poland only.
The basic theoretical assumptions that frame the aforementioned arguments 
are easy to understand. A monopoly (a dominant position) allows an enterprise 
enjoying it to extract the so-called “monopolistic rent”. In economic theory, 
1 The term introduced by the ECC in: Green Paper on Services of General Interest, Brussels, 
21.5.2003, COM (2003) 270 final.
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a company is treated as a unit and is personified. That means that the enterprise 
“acts” in the market and “makes” its own decisions and also, that something 
“lies in the interest of the enterprise” and so on. However, according to the 
theory of organisation, in reality only people can have interests and make 
decisions. There are groups of people that have either the same – sometimes 
merely non-conflicting – or contrary interests. In this paper, a company will 
be considered to be an organisation. The main interest groups acting within 
that organisation will be analysed. The paper will consider the competence of 
each group to make decisions in the name of the enterprise and the power of 
other groups to influence such decisions.
Within a company, three interest groups can be identified: the owners, 
that is, the representatives of the government; the management; and the 
employees. This approach calls for one more party to be considered, namely, 
the state seen here as a law constituent and deemed to be the representative 
of the interest group formed by consumers of monopoly products or services. 
In the following discussion, the term “state” will be used when discussing its 
actions as a law constituent. When casting the state in the role of an owner, 
the term “government” will be used. If both the state and the government act 
as law constituents, they will be referred to as “public authorities”.
At the beginning of the transformation process, the government was the 
only legal owner of the two sectors in question, that is, their monopoly was 
guaranteed by law. A state enterprise was an organisationally independent 
unit, administered by an executive board. The first step in the transformation 
of both sectors came with the withdrawal of their legal monopoly status. This 
step constituted a formal change from a monopolistic, to a dominant position. 
That notion will be noted later in the discussion in the context of “defending 
the monopolistic position”. 
II.  Infrastructure as a distinct, although not distinguished,
economic and legal group of sectors
Even though services of general economic interest have a clearly defined 
place in the national economy2, they do not appear under a separate heading in 
the “services” section of the national statistics. Furthermore, services of general 
economic interest have been controlled and their activities regulated by various 
state authorities, but they have never been legally recognised as a single entity 
and, as such, have not held any particular place in economic theory.
2 Legally defined recently in: Green Paper on Services of General Interest, Brussels, 21.5.2003, 
COM (2003) 270 final.
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In most economic papers, services of general economic interest are usually 
defined by itemising3, a good example of which is a division into the following 
broad categories: transport, energy, communication and communal utilities 
(water etc.).
These infrastructure services share many key characteristics. The most 
significant of them is the natural monopoly phenomenon that continues to 
prevail even after their legal monopoly has been withdrawn. The natural 
monopoly present in these sectors is closely related to a distribution network. 
Each network, dedicated to a specific kind of goods, is essential for connecting 
suppliers to consumers. An interchange of networks is technically impossible 
(oil or gas pipelines cannot supply electricity) while it is economically irrational 
to install two parallel electric (telephone, etc.) cables in one house or factory. 
Similarly, no person would ever consider building parallel rail tracks.
Establishing a network system always requires a substantial initial investment. 
Once the specific structure is in place, the cost of adding a new end-user is 
minimal. All networks have a similar cost structures that differs from the 
one adopted in micro economic theory. Its main features are: extremely high 
initial investments; a long wait for the return on these investments; very high 
maintenance costs that are irrespective of the level of exploitation which, in 
turn, leads to high fixed costs and low variable costs; a high risk of loss on these 
investments (in case of business failure, the assets are rarely transferable). As 
a result, new entry into a market where another enterprise is already operating 
involves a high level of risk. These features have caused, at a certain stage of 
the history of economic development, the nationalisation of these particular 
sectors. 
At the outset of the transformation process in Poland, services of general 
economic interest were purposely excluded from privatisation by legislation4. 
The Act of 19965 repealed the Act of 1990, but created a delegation for 
the government to issue a regulation which should define the companies of 
special interest to the state and economy the privatisation of which will require 
government approval.
3 See K. Bobińska, “Ekonomiczna racjonalność finansowania usług użyteczności publicznej” 
(2005) 4 Studia Ekonomiczne; the article contains examples of the various approaches to 
itemising applied by different authors.
4 See Act of 13 July 1990 on privatisation of state-owned companies (Journal of Laws 
No. 51, item 298). It was the first legal act that allowed transfer of public enterprises to private 
ownership. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 1991 listed the enterprises of special 
importance: among them, power plants, power stations, the railways, telecommunications 
industry, transmission networks, the water boards, gas and oil pipelines, as well as distilleries 
and refineries.
5 The Act of 30 August 1996 on commercialisation and privatisation of state enterprises 
(Journal of Laws No. 118, item 561).
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One of the goals of the Act of 1996 on commercialisation and privatisation 
of state enterprises was to introduce the relativity of the notion of ownership 
change. The Act of 1990 had underlined that the privatisation of public 
enterprises was the principal objective of the reforms and that only privatisation 
meant ownership change. Unlike the Act of 1990, the Act of 1996 spoke about 
a transformation of a state enterprises into a single state-owned shareholding 
company that represents another legal form of state ownership. 
The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 1997, implementing the 
Act of 1996, identified which entities hold special importance to the national 
economy. It adopted a more liberal approach to privatisation in general. 
However, privatisation as such is not the subject of this paper (a public 
monopoly can easily become a privately owned one); the issue considered here 
is a comprehensive de-monopolisation of the market.
The Act of 1996 on commercialisation and privatisation of state enterprises 
has unexpectedly proven to obstruct the process of dividing the previously 
monopolised sectors of general economic interest because it included a clause 
that entitled workers to a 15% share of the monopolist, free of charge, provided 
the company became a public company. The vertically integrated, huge state 
monopolists encompassed, however, varied elements, some of which were 
worth a significant amount, while some, next to nothing. Furthermore, some 
elements were released for quick privatisation, some were to stay public. The 
workers of the state monopolists wanted shares of equal value. The company 
could then start any operations (divisions of property), using its shares but 
not its assets, as it was allowed to do under the previous law. It soon became 
evident that before the employees agreed to divide the entity, the method of 
division of its shares had to be agreed on first.
Such legislative prerequisites opened the door to all sorts of pressurising by 
various interest groups within the company to be privatised. The manoeuvrings 
in the sectors of general economic interest started when the Polish government 
was getting ready to incorporate a series of Community directives that defined 
the process of liberalisation of sectors of general economic inertest. The 
analysis of those factors that influenced the shape of those rules will be the 
subject of further discussion in this paper.
“If the form and realisation of political economy were based on 
a unidirectional influence on the systems, structures, and divisions it deals 
with, most decisions, with respect to production, allocation, or other values, 
would be favourably made (by “ I mean here “close to perfection”) (…). 
However, in the real world interactions exist, and economic politics is not 
some external element unrelated to its subjects”6. Neither the shaping nor 
6 See A. Walczykowska, “Koncentracja a aktywność polityczna korporacji” [in:] M. Raczyński 
i inni, W pogoni za rentą, Warszawa 1998.
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the realisation of regulatory or anti-monopolistic strategies is an activity that 
is free from external influences. Any analysis of the transformation process 
occurring within the sectors of general economic interests should bear this 
in mind. 
III. Tactics of interest groups during the transformation process
Niskanen (1971), one of the precursors of the approach presented in this 
paper, wrote: “[a]mong the several arguments that may enter the bureaucrat’s 
utility function are the following: salary, perquisites (…), public reputation, 
power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease making changes, and ease of 
managing the bureau. All of these variables except the last two, I contend, 
are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau during the 
bureaucrat’s tenure in office”7.
In a monopolistic environment, rent seeking – an activity where firms are 
trying to achieve or secure a favourable position on their markets – has been 
an integral part of modern economics for a long time. The first economic 
theories concerning this issue were discussed by Tullock (1967)8. Early com-
mentators showed, in various scenarios, that the social cost of legally guar-
anteed monopoly was much higher than an average cost of market failure 
because a monopoly, seen as an organisation, was able to wrest for itself more 
privileges.
According to Krueger (1974)9, the term “rent capture” generally means 
swapping market mechanisms for governmental interference in the allocation 
of both labour and capital resources. The result is that subjects concentrate 
their activities on competing for, or securing the transfer of the rent, instead 
of generating profits. It has often been pointed out that such actions are only 
possible in a specific, legally institutionalised environment that favours the 
distribution of wealth and profits to a select group10.
Many argue that the term “rent seeking” should only refer to activities 
of firms in such economies where various forms of state regulation exist 
 7 W.A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago 1971, p. 38. 
 8 G. Tullock, “The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft” (1974) 5 Western Economic 
Journal 224–232; A.O. Krueger, “Government Failures in Development” (1990) 3 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4.
 9 A.O. Krueger, “The political economy of the rent-seeking” (1974) 91 American Economic 
Review 291-303; A.O. Krueger, “Government Failures…”.
10 See M. Raczyński, “Monopol w teorii pogoni za rentą” [in:] M. Raczyński, W pogoni…, 
p. 8 and 11.
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as well as protectionist foreign trade practices, direct governmental transfers, 
and all other forms of preferential treatment. This is the case in this 
analysis. 
Rent seeking attracts various special-interest groups whose actions strongly 
influence the way in which privatisation is carried out. In this analysis, the 
following basic interest groups need to be identified:
A. Three groups within each enterprise: the owners, the executive board, 
and the employees among whom the monopoly rent can be appropriately 
divided between the groups. If the state acts as an owner (sometimes 
merely the majority owner) its role is carried out by the government, 
ministers and their representatives that act in the company’s supervisory 
board; this is why they are being placed within the enterprise. 
B. The state representing national interests, i.e., consumer interests. In this 
role we may see the Parliament and the Regulator.
In the first category, all three interest groups within an enterprise push for 
such a form of privatisation which would guarantee them sustainable gain. The 
game is also played for how these benefits would be shared among these three 
actors. Let us try to define the interests of the group within the enterprise. The 
first group is the government. The objectives of the government (the owner) 
are determined by the fact that it acts in its own short-term interest – it wishes 
to secure such conditions which would guarantee it peaceful reign, at least for 
the duration of the relevant term in office. 
The most important of these conditions – not necessarily in this order, as 
the pattern depends on the situation – are: 
• to maintain stability in the key monopolised industry sectors where 
labour unrest11 would paralyse the country;
• to raise national revenues;
• to fill key positions in state-owned enterprises with figures “stabilising” 
their administration; consequently, to have influence over the decisions 
taken by these companies, not quite privatising the sectors12.
Furthermore, it would be hard to ignore that “the public administration, 
otherwise called bureaucracy – another player among the main characters 
performing on the economic stage”13 – consisting of central, regional, and 
11 A note, Applied Economics Letters, 2001, 8, 273–277, says “labour protection, forced 
through both by the management and the employees, was given as a justification for competition 
protection”. Strike is one of the forms of pressure, whose costs can be easily measured. 
12 Owning shares or company stocks (even minority) in a privatised institution, the 
government can subsidise other public enterprises without cutting the national budget, which 
the failure of these enterprises would inevitably bring.
13 See L. Gilejko, “Aktorzy sfery ekonomicznej i ich strategie” [in:] Socjologia gospodarki. 
Część II: Rynek i otoczenie instytucjonalne, Warszawa 2005.
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local public officials and employees in all modern societies, wields enormous 
power14 (determined by the government’s role in the economy) and pursues 
its own interests. Of course, not all administrators are elite, but the upper 
echelons make for a large segment of the elite group. The size of this segment 
depends on the scale and character of the government’s stake in the economy. 
According to Raczyński, this group is an important player in the “interest 
game”. Its involvement seriously politicises the economy which in turn fosters 
strong ties between several elite groups, especially between the political and 
economic elites15.
The second interest group whose actions affect the transformation process 
from within the company is the executive board. Government ownership 
guarantees the upholding of high office positions which, apart from other 
benefits, gives the executive board the freedom to hire others onto posts lower 
in the company’s hierarchy. It also allows its members to participate in the 
“office shuffle”, to seek promotion to a ministerial position, to the board of 
directors, or even presidency of the company.
Gilejko suggests that in post-socialist countries, the struggle for power in the 
economic arena has not ceased. It mostly occurs in the relationships between 
the state (government, state bureaucracy) and other participants in the game 
(like the management of state enterprises which supports bureaucracy in the 
struggle for rent). This situation is not exclusive to post-socialist nations, but 
it is here where it is most noticeable. Various options based on monopolisa-
tion create favourable conditions for the alliance between the government 
and various interest groups. Gilejko suggests that bureaucracy, acting in its 
own interest, strengthens the short-term benefits of the government. It is also 
in the interest of the executive board to maintain the monopolistic position 
of their enterprise. Moreover, the board favours limited owner interference 
in the actual administration of the company with prospects of easy access to 
public subsidies. In other words, it would prefer its enterprise to be state-
owned but with a corporate structure or, ideally, the structure of a holding 
company. If, however, privatisation was to occur, the most attractive option for 
the executive team would be to sell the company’s minority shares, preferably 
on a stock exchange.
Surprisingly, the workers unions support the position of the management. 
Although most analyses suggest that the interests of the unions stand in direct 
14 Ibidem. 
15 “In most capitalist countries, over 40% of workforce in public administration and 
nationalized industries are employed directly by the government”. A. Giddens, Socjologia, 
Poznań 1998, p. 83 (cited after L. Gilejko, “Aktorzy sfery…”). The situation has changed since 
then.
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opposition to those of the management16, in the case of rent-seeking, says 
Strumme, or to retain a monopoly status quo, the situation appears to be 
totally different. Both interest groups share the same objective, some of the 
forms of behaviour (in the process of realisation of these interests) turned 
out to be uniform17.
Concerning the legal conditions of the monopolised industry sectors in the 
Polish economy, job security is clearly a prime objective for all employees. But 
the workers also want to preserve the financial benefits (such as the legally 
guaranteed 15% share in the company’s stock) gained during the process of 
the commercialisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. There are 
other benefits such as the fact that salaries and promotions are not determined 
by work output or efficiency. As a result, employees support privatisation but 
to a very limited extend. In consequence, only a minority stake in the company 
is sold on the stock market – as long as the state remains the company’s main 
owner, employees can maintain their privileges. The government’s symbolic 
sale of one share of the company not only guarantees employee status quo, but 
also brings them a financial reward in the form of a “privatisation bonus”. At 
the same time, the price of the employee-owned shares (usually sold on soon 
after they have been obtained) depends on the extent to which the monopoly 
can be preserved.
Accordingly, the interests of the workforce coincide (or, at least, they are not 
in conflict) with those of the management, as the welfare of the management 
greatly depends on the extent of the “contentment” of its employees. Only 
the workers can go on strike. They can successfully block any changes that 
would limit a monopoly status of their firm with threats of industrial action 
that could cause stoppages in the delivery of products or services in the entire 
country – a major fear of public officials. Although strikes are usually initiated 
at the grass-roots, they are often encouraged at the top. This happens when 
the management decides it is also in their interest to demand from the owner 
– the government – some concessions.
There is little research in Poland that deals with specific (different to other 
sectors) configuration of interests occurring in the sectors of general economic 
interests. For this reason, it is all the more important to refer to the work of 
Gadowska18 on “clientelism” and activities of interest groups within the coal-
mining industry, a sector whose basic features resemble services of general 
economic interest and which, in Poland at least, up to now had never been 
16 See O. R. Straume, “Rent-seeking in a unionized monopoly” (2002) 3 Economics of 
Governance 117–134.
17 See S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger [in:] Patrons, Clients and Friends, p. 28 (cited after 
L. Gilejko, “Aktorzy sfery…”).
18 See K. Gadowska, Zjawisko klientelizmu polityczno–ekonomicznego, Kraków 2002, p. 19.
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earmarked for privatisation. She writes: “,(…) the goal of a system analysis 
of the network interactions in the coal-mining industry, and its influence 
on the sector’s restructuring, is to shed light on the way politics infiltrates 
economic life at the expense of public interest and the common good of the 
society”.
According to this author, no clear distinction has been made in the 
post-communist countries between their economic and political system. 
Therefore, on the one hand, today’s difficulties to separate them have their 
roots in the past; on the other, the change from a centralised economy to 
the free-market, often requires political involvement. Any decisions directly 
affecting the economy are made at the political level. This is particularly true in 
the case of actions taken by state-owned commercial units because the course 
of the restructuring of their sectors is controlled by government bodies.
Long before the post-socialist transformation, Rowley19 wrote that rent-
seeking is not really an action initiated by individual players for their own 
sake – as it is often portrayed in economic models – but rather, an action 
taken by large companies operating under the management of executive 
boards20. Because of the principal–agent conflict in these cases (managers use 
the company’s money instead of their own in rent-seeking activities), there is 
a tendency to take higher risks which, in turn, lead to excessive costs associated 
with the pursuit of the monopolistic rent21.
IV.  The analysis of transformations occurring within 
the chosen sectors
Since Poland signed the EU Accession Treaty in 1994, all of its existing 
legislation had to comply with European law in general and, in the context 
of the two infrastructure sectors analysed in this paper, to sector-specific 
directives in particular. The liberalisation of the energy field started first. 
“In 1992, the European Commission’s proposed the directive liberalising 
the sector that would gradually lead to the formation of a single European 
energy market”. The key objectives of the proposed directive were: to 
increase competition in the generation of energy; to foster third-party 
19 Ch. Rowley (ed.), The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Introduction, London 1989.
20 R.L. Faith, R.S. Higgins, R.D Tollison, Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in 
the Coasian Firm, The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in: Ch. Rowley (ed.), The Political 
Economy…
21 In Poland, a significant increase in costs occurred during the mutual exchange of posts 
between ministries and large industry corporations.
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access (TPA) to networks; and, to separate the internal concentration of 
the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply of energy. Although 
many interest groups met the proposed reforms with suspicion 22, the draft 
was not rejected outright. In view of the reform process occurring in the, 
broadly understood, energy sector, it is useful to consider its market structure. 
Are energy generation and supply functions competitive? Are distribution 
networks of the primary energy resources the only natural monopoly? One 
of the hypotheses is that since energy cannot be transmitted to consumers 
without a network, the whole chain becomes a natural monopoly. During the 
transformation process, the interested parties have been pressing towards 
such a market structure; what was achieved is a market structure where a few 
big companies hold power stations and distribution networks. The third-party 
access (TPA) rule is the method to introduce competition to an oligopolistic 
market structure. 
Several Member States were in conflict with the Commission, wanting 
to support the monopoly status of their energy enterprises23. That fact only 
confirmed how widely popular the phenomenon of state monopoly protection 
was – together with its numerous prerogatives – considering the short-term 
interest of public officials. As a result, the Commission submitted a new 
proposal suggesting an even more gradual process for the formation of a single 
energy market within the European Union. The 96/93/EC Directive was the 
final document regulating electricity markets. To conform to the EU directive, 
the Polish government prepared the Energy Act of 1997, which regulated open-
market procedures, price policies, and the energy tariff system. The changes in 
the organisational structure of the energy sector to which this Act refers were 
introduced24 at the beginning of the 1990s and were based, in most part, on 
the British model25. However, not one decision on privatisation was made at 
that time26. In other words, no competition existed because the government, 
as a single owner, could not compete with itself. As the owner, the government 
was unlikely to act contrary to its own interests even if the state (as a law 
22 P. Jasiński, “Światowe trendy w przemyśle energetycznym” [in] A. Szablewski (ed.), 
Mecha nizmy rynkowe w energetyce i telekomunikacji. Monografie, No. 8, INE PAN, Warszawa 
1996.
23 It is worth noting that the question of common energy policy had not been raised until 
2007, mainly under pressure from Poland.
24 The Act of 5 February 1993 on ownership restructuring certain state-owned enterprises 
of special importance for the national economy (Journal of Laws No. 16 item 69).
25 See J. Popczyk, “Od monopolu do rynku” [in:] P. Jasiński, T. Skoczny (eds.), Elektroener-
getyka, Warszawa, 1996.
26 A. Lipowski, “Procesy restrukturyzacji w przedsiębiorstwach przemysłowych okresu trans-
formacji systemowej (wprowadzenie do problematyki)” [in:] E. Mączyńska (ed.), Restrukturyza-
cja przedsiębiorstw w procesie transformacji gospodarki polskiej, Warszawa 2001.
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constituent) tried to create favourable conditions for competition within the 
sector. It appeared, however, that the legislators had ignored one obvious 
principle of the free market: that in order to compete, more than one market 
player is needed. 
The legislation also established a chronology of transmission rights 
granted to each consumer group and gradually lowered the threshold enabling 
access to the market so that by 2007 all consumers, large and small, would 
be free to choose their electricity supplier from a range of functioning 
businesses. 
However, enterprises were strongly motivated to include distribution units, 
which are natural monopolies, within their wider organisational structure and 
the law did not exactly disallow grass-roots consolidation activities (initiated 
by the management of small enterprises not by the government). They rightly 
assumed that the bigger the corporation and fewer the choices, the greater 
the possibility of price control and the lesser the chance for the end user to 
change a supplier. The energy distribution networks were the first to start 
consolidating; for example, the creation of the Southern Electric Power 
Corporation, ENEA or BOT was decided by the executive boards of each of 
the participating companies. Accordingly, seven large distribution and three 
mixed (with both generation and distribution) corporations were created as 
a result of grass-roots actions. The energy generation segment of the sector, 
which included several dozen electric-power stations and heat and power 
plants, was not included in the original consolidation efforts.
The government’s approach to Polish energy markets was not coherent 
after 1996. It was unclear which concentrations should take place before, and 
which after the privatisation of the subjects in question. No general strategic 
plans existed and no rules concerning vertical integration within the process 
of privatisation were defined, not even in relation to international investors 
who already had such links.
The 2006 government “Programme for the Electricity Industry”27 revealed 
a conflict of interests by including goals that were inconsistent in their 
principles (they excluded each other). For instance, one of the main objectives 
of the programme was to reduce the costs of electric-power generation, 
transmission, and distribution by increasing productivity through effective 
management of network activities and improving efficiency in electricity 
generation companies. These objectives were in direct conflict with the 
very principle of the programme which aimed to divide the market among 
a few consolidated, powerful corporations with the ability to dictate terms to 
consumers and to block any new market entry. Such corporations would have 
27 Program dla Elektroenergetyki, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, March 2006.
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enough leveraging power to remain ineffectively managed and not to induce 
economic efficiency.
The Programme for the Electricity Industry created favourable conditions 
for the emergence of large energy conglomerates. A dominant position in the 
market was attained by Polskie Sieci Energetyczne [Polish Electricity Grid] S.A. 
(PSE), a former transmission system operator, that, through the acquisition of 
several electric-power stations, formed the Polska Grupa Energetyczna [Polish 
Energy Group] S.A. (PGE) structured as a holding company. The next biggest 
market players were the Southern Energy Group TAURON, as well as the 
ENEA and ENERGA distribution companies. 
The birth of these powerful energy groups, with vertically integrated 
holding structures, formed a so-called oligopolistic competition. Thus, the 
implementation of the government 2006 programme was nothing but an 
expansion of the monopolistic system. This trend was foreseen by Popczyk28 
who pointed out the danger of establishing an unhealthy market structure in 
the Polish electricity industry that can hinder competition. In addition, large 
power plants (the dominant segment of the consolidated holding companies) 
get direct access to consumers via the distribution units (with which they now 
form one enterprise) and thus can dictate the price without being afraid that 
other power stations will offer lower price. Using this method to prove their 
credit solvency, power plants are able to secure new loans for “old-fashioned 
investments”. It is important to note that no money changed hands during the 
acquisition process. The acquisition of distributors occurred merely through a 
shuffle of government ownership. J. Popczyk also noted that a transformation 
process where “a political-corporate system changes into a corporate-only 
system”, gives corporations so much influence that it renders the government 
powerless. In 2008, one of the largest quasi-monopolies, ENEA, abandoned an 
earlier plan to sell the majority of its shares to a strategic investor, and instead 
decided to use the stock exchange to privatise (despite falling stock indices) 
its minority stock. With the privatisation on the stock market concluded, the 
government continues to retain the majority of its shares and thus remains 
its “decisive” owner. That means that the status quo is preserved according to 
the best interests of all interested parties.
The railway industry, which is the second example of services of general 
interest sector discussed in this paper, has only two segments: (1) the rail-track 
network that forms a natural monopoly, and (2) the passenger and freight 
transportation systems which is completely ready to be de-monopolised and 
opened for competition. The natural monopoly structure of rail-tracks differs, 
28 J. Popczyk, “Elektroenergetyka – prywatyzacja po polsku” [in:] K. Bobińska, Prywatyzacja 
infrastruktury, Zeszyty TEP, No. 9, May 2005.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
144  KRYSTYNA BOBIŃSKA
however, from the electricity sector as it has long been exposed to inter-
modal29 competition. 
The EU has taken a long time to formulate guidelines for the liberalisation 
of railways30. The 2001/12/EU directive on the European rail system replaced 
Directive 91/440/EEC which only mandated the financial separation of 
networks. The 2001 Directive set out the dates for the liberalisation of each 
type of transportation.
The discussions on restructuring of the Polskie Koleje Państwowe [Polish 
National Railways] (PKP) started in 1998 and followed the EU legislation 
which was already under discussion for several years. The 2001/12/EU Directive 
that was finally issued demanded financial independence for rail-tracks as 
well as a total separation of passenger lines from freight. The first Polish 
transformation plan was to divide PKP into several independent entities. 
However, the suggested structural changes met with firm opposition from its 
workforce leading to a general strike31. The Act on the Commercialisation, 
Restructuring, and Privatisation of PKP, based on different principles, was 
finally passed more than a year later (on 1st January 2001).
As a result, PKP was divided into about a dozen interdependent companies32 
organised under the umbrella of a holding company. Each firm was headed by 
a president, executive officers and a supervisory board. The parent company, 
PKP S.A., became the owner of all assets of the transformed enterprises 
and a major shareholder in each of its subsidiaries. The most important 
companies in the group include: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe [Polish Rail 
Lines] S.A. which manages the rail-track infrastructure; the PKP Cargo S.A 
which operates freight lines; and two passenger lines – PKP Intercity and PKP 
Regionalne Linie Kolejowe [Regional Rail Lines] S.A. The subsidiaries do 
not compete with each other seeing as each has a defined area of operation 
while their size and economic power allow them to maintain their monopoly 
status. 
The transformation of the railway sector into a single holding company has 
created multiple opportunities for various forms of covert activities including 
cross-subsidies and guarantees of equal employee participation in receiving 
shares the value of which has been based on all assets of the holding. The 
functionality of the structural set up and sole state ownership eliminates 
the possibility of competition and, eo ipso, does not demand increased 
29 Such as other transportation systems: ground (car, bus) and air (airplane).
30 Liberalisation process at the European Union level began in early 1990s (with the 91/440 
Directive on the common rail development).
31 Which ended with the resignation of the minister.
32 All PKP services were organised into separate businesses, e.g., PKP Telecommunications, 
PKP Energy etc. 
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productivity. The only method of improving profitability introduced by the 
new management was to reduce the number of operating rail lines. This 
action was presented by PKP as part of its reorganisation plan33 and diligently 
executed ever since.
One method, among many, used to strengthen the monopolistic position 
of PKP, was to introduce the law on licences for railway operation. The PKP 
granted these licences ex lege and forever. Its all competitors had to reapply 
for them without any guarantee of renewal. It is important that the other, 
then PKP, companies were cargo companies with about a few percent of PKP 
Cargo’s capacity. As these provisions were introduced retrospectively, the bias 
in the treatment of similar companies was all the more visible. Only pressures 
from two interest PKP groups – the management and the workforce – could 
have explained such unfair business practices.
At the same time, the deficit of the group has grown to non-repayable 
proportions, and it became clear that the situation would not be resolved 
without a heavy subsidy. The subsequent strategic plan for 2003–200634 made 
the government responsible for all public debts of the PKP group35. According 
to this plan, two types of companies could function within the national 
transportation system – commercial ones, and those remaining in the public 
domain (PKP Regional Rail Lines). The Authors of the plan hoped that the 
organisation of the persistently unprofitable Regional Rail Lines would be 
subsidised by the State budget. The government remained, however, a major 
shareholder of PKP Intercity and the PKP Cargo which were granted the 
option of being privatised. The 2003–2006 strategic plan proposed, at the same 
time, that the State should be responsible for the financing and development 
of the rail infrastructure36.
The 2003–2006 strategic plan did not succeed probably for two reasons: 
the likely opposition of public authorities to the scale of such flagrant subsidy; 
and the obvious bias in the division of the monopolised sector: the network 
– a government-financed natural monopoly; national rail lines – earmarked for 
privatisation, with the potential to remain competitive on a freed rail-transport 
market; and regional lines – partially subsidised by local authorities but with 
its ownership structure left unchanged, that is, one regional company for the 
whole country expected to be subsidised by all local governments without, 
however, giving them any influence on its behaviour. Although the strategy 
33 A 2001 expert report for the Ministry of Transportation. Where it is shown that it improves 
only the passenger per km. efficiency but dramatically lowers the passenger per employee 
efficiency. 
34 Accepted by the government in 2003.
35 And a total debt suspension or payment deferral until after 2010.
36 See K. Bobińska, Ekonomiczna racjonalność…
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was in line with EU guidelines37 on the financing of public services, it limited 
employee benefits, usually gained in the course of privatisation, on one hand, 
and deprived the local governments of any control over the running of the 
company, on the other. Local governments wanted to own the freestanding 
regional lines and, consequently, refused to cooperate. In the mean time, the 
deficit deepened as the regional lines accounted for most of the PKP Group’s 
external debt38.
The threat of a general strike brought about a new strategic plan for 
2006–2009. While it kept the status quo in general, it provided for two, albeit 
significant, changes: it permitted a division of the PKP Regional Rail Lines, but 
with the agreement of both interested parties – local governments and PKP. 
Moreover, PKP Polish Rail Lines, responsible for rail-track infrastructure, 
would rejoin the parent company. This was exactly the kind of monopoly 
which the workers had been waiting for. The plan was, therefore, accepted 
and put into effect. It intentionally allowed for the rail-line operators within 
the holding company to be separated along the lines of their functionality 
to avoid internal competition. In other words, each was given monopoly in 
the area of its capacity39. Moreover, PKP’s movable property (PKP transport 
sources) was deliberately divided inadequately to the needs of individual 
operators; for example, all PKP locomotives were reserved for the PKP Cargo, 
giving a purely commercial operator an unfair advantage40, and putting an 
unjustified financial burden on those, who might be entitled to ask for public 
subsidy. 
The 2006–2009 strategic plan did not cut the budgetary aids, neither does 
it account for the loss of tax revenue from the newly created group. However, 
it would be prudent to assume that the authors anticipate the financial aid 
needed to by far exceed the level of the financial losses incurred by the PKP 
Group. As often stressed in the plan, the profitability of the PKP Group 
depends on the government’s financial support which – on the other hand 
– should contribute to social stability. This represents an open threat to the 
state that, if it refuses the appropriate amount of money, the PKP will go on 
strike.
The size and form of the expected “support” do not follow the criteria 
precisely defined by the European Court of Justice41 for subsidies to services 
of general economic interest. Such aid would be considered by the EU as 
37 White Paper on services of general interest, Brussels, 12.5.2004, COM (2004) 374 final.
38 It amounted to PLN 5.8 billion at the end of 2006.
39 For example, Mazovia Rail Lines (Koleje Mazowieckie).
40 CARGO leases out locomotives to regional lines, a public service institution financed by 
a local government, and, in reality, covertly subsidises CARGO.
41 Judgment of 24 July 2003 in the case C–280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR 7747.
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an illegal subsidy which the government could not guarantee. Therefore, the 
realisation of the strategic plan for 2006–2009 is in doubt. This ambiguity could 
have been the reason for the creation of a new programme, published in 2007, 
concerning the period of time between 2007–2013. 
The 2007–2013 strategic plan does not change any of the pre-existing 
principles. It does, however, put the state in the role of a coordinator of 
the development of the rail network leaving the actual supervision and 
maintenance of the national rail infrastructure42 in the hands of Polish Rail 
Lines. It expects operational costs to be covered jointly by the national and 
local budgets, European Union funds, bank loans, and own resources. It 
leaves the entire company stock in the hands of the government. The newest 
plan considers the stabilisation of the financial situation of, first, PKP S.A. 
as the corporation’s parent company, and then, of the rest of the group. To 
strengthen the group’s overall administrative system, members of the PKP 
S.A. Board of Directors will serve as the presidents of the supervisory boards 
of its subsidiaries. As the head company, PKP S.A. is now the main party 
responsible for improving of the group’s finances. 
The problems of PKP Regional Lines have also been dealt with. By 2009, 
the company is expected to regain solvency43. It is to be split “equally” 
and handed over to the 16 Polish regional governments. In line with the 
strategic plan, the transition of the regional lines to the jurisdiction of local 
authorities will “maintain the national character of the regional rail transport, 
improve the quality of services, and strengthen the unity of the transportation 
system in the region”. As a result, the unprofitable regional rail lines will 
no longer strain the PKP’s financial health while the lucrative interregional 
transportation system will remain under the governance of the group. In a 
typical monopolistic manner, this approach will preserve high-level jobs in a 
separate, profitable business and limit the financial losses of the group as a 
whole while making the local authorities take over all of the responsibilities 
associated with running and maintaining of the unprofitable regional rail 
lines.
The government will retain its position as a major shareholder of PKP Cargo 
which will assume the role of “a national rail freight company” and is expected 
to start selling its minority stock by 2010. Similarly, the majority of shares of 
PKP Intercity will remain state-owned, and the PKP S.A. outstanding debt will 
be fully covered by the national reserves. When the ideas of restructuring PKP 
42 The strategy for the rail transportation sector assumes the infrastructure maintenance to 
be the responsibility of the state.
43 At the end of 2006, the company’s deficit amounted to more than PLN 2.1 billion and 
exceeded the value of its assets. In 2008-2009, the company is expected to receive PLN 1,860 
million in government loans.
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were first formulated, public authorities refrained from openly subsidising 
services of general economic interest which, while allowed by European 
rules, demands accountability in return. The only possible solution for the 
government appeared to be to consolidate inefficient, but socially-needed, 
operators with efficient units to cover up an illegal appropriation of public 
funds for commercial businesses. The necessity of subsidising the public service 
obligations had been accepted later.
The newest strategic plan appeases the interests of the government and 
executive groups by keeping the organisational structure of the PKP Group in 
the form of a holding company creating a suitable number of executive jobs. 
On the other hand, the limited privatisation, included in this plan, that is, the 
public sale of a minority share of PKP stock, gives the employees a 15% share 
of the company. In addition, the position of the workforce is strengthened 
by the compelling, strategic principle that “the government guarantees social 
stability” for all firms part of the holding company, and that no persons from 
outside the sector will be nominated to the supervisory bodies of the PKP 
Group companies. There really is nothing that could be added to the latest 
strategic plan for the Polish rail sector that would better preserve the objectives 
pursued by its three interest groups.
V.  Conclusions: The scale of the preservation monopolistic market 
in the sectors after the transformation
Before the transformation, both of the analysed industries (the electricity 
and the railway sector) had two distinct market structures. After fifteen years 
of organisational reforms and property transfers from one form of state 
ownership to another, they both eventually adopted a comparable, though 
slightly different, structure of a holding company. While the energy sector 
encompasses several holding companies that have created an oligopolistic 
form of market structure, the rail industry has converted into a single holding 
company that incorporates one enterprise considered to be a natural monopoly 
as well as several others that retains dominance in each of their market 
segments. Inevitably, in both cases some form of monopolistic competition 
has developed which is, however, very difficult to monitor. 
In addition, during the long legislative process when many Polish laws had 
to be revised to comply with European Union directives, the various interest 
groups within the discussed sectors managed to gain a maximum number 
of government guarantees: the executives had their positions secured, the 
employees not only escaped job cuts but also received company shares as 
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a result of privatisation. Such a situation can only exist in a monopolistic 
environment, as only then can a monopoly rent be discounted (the interested 
groups can profit from the monopoly rent) – no matter whether the rent is 
collected directly from the consumer (the energy sector) or from the state, 
i.e., from taxpayers (the railways). 
In the course of market privatisation, the government has retained the 
majority of the shares in question, guaranteeing the preservation of the 
monopolistic status quo that benefits other interested groups, including 
private shareholders. Who, considering the initial interest groups, benefits 
most from privatisation? The government enjoys a short-term benefit resulting 
from the sale of a part of its shares while still retaining a majority stake in 
the companies. The corporation remains a monopoly and the government, 
as a majority shareholder, is interested in its profits. Therefore, it lies in the 
interest of the government to keep the status quo for as long as possible. At 
the same time, board members can hold on to their executives jobs, and the 
employees receive, a legally due, company share package as well as secured 
employment and the power to exert considerable pressure on the government 
(major share owner) and demand ever-increasing privileges. 
In short, it has been to the advantage of all three interest groups to secure 
the monopoly status for their enterprise. As economic theory points out, only 
the enterprises that act on a monopolistic (or oligopolistic) market can enjoy 
monopoly profits which permits the pursuit of various forms of rent, the goal 
of all three analysed groups. 
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